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ABSTRACT 
Evaluating the safety of large dams by means of an average value 
of failures taken over a lang time-span of dam history leads to inadequate 
results, since it eliminates most of the declining trend. It appears that 
an analysis that evaluates the trend as such is required to obtain a 
proper assessment of the safety performance as a basis for failure prog-
nosis and thereby for decision making an investments. 
Trends appear in dependencies an three different variables: year 
of failure, year of construction,and age. Two different methods are pre-
sented to ·analyze these trends: one method for the trend analysis of the 
fatlure occurrence in time for a dam population, and a secend method for 
the combined analysis of trends in the construction year and age depen-
dencies. The first method is applied to large dams in the U.S.A. and in 
Western Europe built after 1850, combined as well as for individual dam 
types, whereas the secend method is only applied to U.S. embankment dams 
because of its more extensive data requirements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The economi c importance of dams for water, .food and energy supp ly 
led to the construction of a large number of dams, especially jn the re-
cent fifty years. The "World Register of Dams" (Ref. 1) lists in 1973 
over 13,000 large dams, characterized essentially by their height being 
larger than 15m. As larger dams are impressive constructions, failures 
or ruptures of large dams are spectacular and widely recognized accidents, 
sometimes with disastraus consequences. The increased interest of the 
public in safety and risk requires an adequate description of the safety 
performance of dams, especi a lly 1 arge dams. 
Dam safety is sometimes quantified in terms of an overall historic-
al average of about 1 % chance of a dam to rupture, leading to a total 
loss. Such a characterization is inadequate as it disregards the tech-
nical progress that led to an impressive improvement of dam safety. This 
becomes evident in a number of detailed analyses that aim at a description 
of this technical progress, e.g. Schnitter, 1967 (Ref. 2) and 1976 (Ref. 3), 
Rissler, 1981 (Ref. 4), Serafim, 1981 (Ref. 5), Vogel, 1982 (Ref. 6) 
and Blind, 1982 (Ref. 7). Typical quantification concepts employed were 
"failures per dam-year," the "fraction" or "percentage of dams failed," 
and the age dependency of failure occurrences. 
A general problern of these statistical analyses is that terminal 
ruptures of dams are "rare events". This is even more so when the entire 
dam population is subdivided in smaller categories, be it by distinguish-
ing dam types (such as concrete or embankment dams), or by introducing 
differentiated height limitations (e.g. larger than 15 meters, or larger 
than 40 meters), by grouping dams by geographical location (e.g. U.S.A. 
vs Western Europe) or by distinguishing causes of failures. But problems 
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of analysing a sparse statistical data base are not limited to dam failures. 
Recently, improved statistical techniques have been developed ad-
dressing the three quantification concepts mentioned above. In Refs. 8 
through 10 a method for trend analysis of "failure rates per operation-year" 
in a population of technical systems is developed. Reference 11 is con-
cerned with a refined evaluation of the fraction of units failed, as a 
function of the construction year, that appears to be a suitable con-
cept for the demonstration of the technical progress. In addition, the 
age distribution of failure occurrences is investigated in Ref. 11. In 
this paper the methods developed in Refs. 8 through 11 are proposed for 
the investigation of dam safety. 
In Sect. II the approach of Refs. 8 to 10 is briefly reviewed; 
it is subsequently applied to the trend analysis of failure rates per 
operation year of dams in the U.S.A. and Western Europe, including separate 
analyses of embankment and concrete dams as well as a differentiation 
with respect to causes of failures. Section III then addresses the failure 
ratio, the ~ge distribution of failures, and the "failure potential" that 
may still be contained in a given population, or its "marginal" value 
that is added in a certain construction period. 
The results of these statistical analyses can and should be related 
to the historical development of the technology of dam design and con-
struction. As the authors of this paper have no expertise in this area 
no attempt is made here ~o specifically relate the various identified 
trends to particular technological developments. 
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II. FAlLURE RATE TRENDS FOR POPULATIONS OF LARGE DAMS 
II.l Trend Analysis of Rare Events in Terms of Failure Rates 
Major failures of large technical systems such as large dams are 
comparatively "rare" events. "Rare" in this context means that the average 
time-span between two or a very few failure events is so large that the 
technical progress during this time is not insignificant. In these cases 
then a sparse data base is being assembled while the technology is chang-
ing underneath. In such a situation, average values of failure rates formed 
over langer periods of time are not the best characterization. 
Dividing the number of failures during the entire operation of a 
technology prior to time t by the total number of operation years yields 
a "historical average failure rate" per operation year, say [H(t). If this 
"running" historical average value were- aside from statistical fluctua-
tions- independent qf t, the characterization of the entire operation 
history by a simple average value would be justified. However, if newer 
units are safer as it is the case for large dams and most other technolo-
gies, [H(t) tends to decrease. This indicates a learning effect or technical 
progress. If [H(t) decreases in a statistically significant way, it does 
not properly reflect the failure rate of existing populations of technical 
units, since it combines failures in old and new technologies without 
explicit allowance for safety improvements. It may contain failure modes 
that are no langer possible or are by now much less likely than in the past. 
A more sophisticated analysis is then called for. 
Knowledge of the technical progress in dam building, supported by 
a statistically significant decrease in [H(t), as shown below, provides 
"prior information" that can be exploited in the statistical analysis. 
Instead of lumping the information in average values, one tries to ex-
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tract a 11 trend 11 from the stochastically varying data. Regression procedures 
for this purpese often employ an analytical function with free parameters 
(e.g. linear, parabolic or exponential functions) that are determined by 
a least square procedure. The 11 isotonic regression 11 proposed here for the 
analysis of trends in dam failure rates does not employ continuous functions; 
it requires the estimates tobe monotonous, reflecting the notion of a 
monotonaus technical progress. If the actuarial data should not be consistent 
with the trend assumption, the procedure would yield a constant ·rate 
estimate, actually the same value as [H for the particular time. The trend 
analysis procedure using isotonic regression is presented in Refs. 8 through 
10. Here only the main concepts are reviewed as a basis for the subsequent 
application. 
The procedure is based on the operation-time differences, 6Tk' 
between successive failure events, numbered k-1 and k. It yields as iso-
tonic estimates the setofvalues,6Tk' with 
for all k (if prior information suggested an improvement of the safety 
performance). The stochastic variations that normally perturb the monotony 
-
of the 6Tk have been eliminated in the evaluation of the 6Tk . 
• The inverse values of these 6Tk yield the d~sired failure rate 
estimates: 
The Lk represent then a declining failure rate for the investigated dam 
population, that allows learning and technical progress to manifest itself 
in terms of a generally decreasing sequence of Lk: 
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If over some periods of time statistical fluctuations overshadow an under-
lying technical progress, the Lk in this periodwill appear tobe the 
same (see the numerical results and the corresponding discussion in II.2.). 
A tentatively identified trend needs to be evaluated for its statistical 
significance. Methods to evaluate the trend significance are indicated 
in Ref. 10. 
The application of this trend analysis procedure to failures of 
large dams is presented in Sec. II.2. 
II.2 Trend Analysis of Dam Failure Rates in USA and Western Europe 
The data of dam failures used in this analysis are presented in 
Tables 1 through 4, with dam ruptures listed in chronological order, 
beginning 1850. In addition to the name of the dam, its construction year, 
the tables contain the dam type and height, and the cause of the failure 
given as overtopping, seepage, foundation failure, and others. Tables 1 
and 2 list embankment dam failures and Tables 3 and 4 concrete dam failures, 
in both cases for USA and Western Europe (W.E.) respectively. 
Based on the failure dates and detailed information on construction 
dates for all large dams, the number of operation years, the ~Tk' between 
successive failures were evaluated. The ~Tk were then subjected to isotonic 
regression, yielding the monotonously stretched sequence of ~Tk-values. 
Both, the ~Tk and the ~Tk are listed in Table 5 for embankment dams in 
USA and for concrete dams in USA and W.E. respectively. The large number 
of embankment dam failures in USA allowed a differentiation with respect 
to failure causes. The corresponding ~Tk and ~Tk values are listed in 
Table 6. 
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Figure 1 represents Lk' the inverse sequence of the ATk' i.e. 
the failure rates per operation year for embankment and con~rete dams in 
USA and W.E., plotted over a linear time axis of the failure years. In all 
three diagrams the failure rates show a strongly declining trend, by about 
a factor of 40 for US embankment dams. Concrete dams show an even strenger 
decrease. The overal1 failure frequency of darns in Western Europe, 
especially before 1930, appears to be considerably lower than that of 
US dams. All failure rate diagrams indicate a remarkable improvement of 
the level of safety in these dam populations. 
The overa11 declining trend of failure rates presented in Fig. 1 
(and below in Fig. 2) is interrupted by periods of 11constant 11 rate estimates. 
Over these periods, statistical fluctuations appeared in a form of particu-
larly small time intervals, ATk' that obscure and over~hadow the underlying 
trend of increasing ATk and thus decreasing failure rates Lk. It should 
be noted that a sequence of constant ATk values does not suggest an actual 
constant failure rate; it merely means that the estimation procedure cannot 
discern a declining rate. Mostly, such periods of constant rate estimates 
are followed by periods of above average decline estimates, where the 
statistical fluctuations of the intervals ATk appear in the opposite 
direction. 
In addition to the total frequency of US embankment dam failures 
shown in Fig. 1, individual causes are considered in Fig. 2. (It should 
be noted, however, that there is no rigorous additivity within this group 
of Lk-his~ograms, because the isotonic regression is independently applied 
to each set of data.) 
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III. FAlLURE RATIO, FAlLURE AGE DISTRIBUTION, FAlLURE POTENTIAL 
III.l Evaluation of the Actuarial Information, the Failure Ratio and 
the Age Distributions 
The failure trend analysis presented in Sec. II.1 evaluates the 
safety behavior of an existing population comprised of units of ~ifferent 
vintage. The results of this trend analysis show a considerable decline of 
the failure rate per operation year as a function of time that exhibits 
an 11 average 11 learning process for this varying aggregate of large dams. For 
an investigation of the relation of the corresponding technical progress 
with a failure rate trend it is however more important to analyze the 
specific trend of dams as a function of the construction year (tc). In 
addition, there is the age distribution of failure events~ that- in proper 
combination with the construction year dependency- make up the failure 
trend of the dam aggregate. A procedure for the evaluation of these con-
cepts is presented in Ref. 11. Here only the main concepts are outlined 
as a basis for the subsequent application. 
The actuarial data on failure events as a function of the two 
variables, construction year tc and age ,, can be represented as do~s 
in a tc-, diagram, that may be called the failure date matrix. Figure 3 
shows as an example the failure date matrix for large U.S. embankment dams 
with failures between 1850 and 1975, i.e. for a period of 125 years. The 
specific rupture events depicted in Fig. 3 are listed in Tab. 1. 
The "failure ratio 11 S(tc, •s) measures the chance for a failure 
as a function of the construction year; more precisely, it is the fraction 
of the b(tc) dams, constructed in the 11year 11 tc (er construction period tc), 
that has a (major) failure during a designated operation period 's after 
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construction. Since major failures are unlikely-events, the chance for a 
secend failure is remote; it is therefore disregarded in the following 
analysis. 
Since failures do not occur evenly distributed as a function of 
their age T, one introduces a function K(tc,T) that describes the distribu-
tion of the b(tc) S(tc,Ts) failures within the considered age interval 
0 < T < T • 
- - s 
First approximations for the quantities S and K can be obtained 
from the presentation of the actuarial data in Fig. 3. The procedure 
-developed in Ref. 11 is a refined evaluation of- S(tc,T5 ) and K(tc,T). 
The fi rst approximations S and K, denoted by s1 (tc) and K1 (T) re---
spectively, can be obtained from Fig. 3 by summing up failure events along 
respective directions, keeping the other variable constant: Horizontal 
summation yields b(tc) s1(tc); the vertical summation yields at first the 
number of failures at age T, i.e. M(T). It can be readily converted in a 
normalized age·distribution, K1(T), by dividing by its integral. 
Since dam failures are rare events, it is necessary for these summa-
tions to choose larger than annual intervals. The size of the intervals 
depends on the actuarial data as such; one always has to make a compromise 
between trend identification and statistical error. The set of intervals 
for tc and T shown in Fig. 3 results from trying to have the relative 
statistical errors comparable to the change of the respective continuous 
approximations through each interval. In some cases, this may even suggest 
to have only one event in an interval. The chosen T-intervals vary greatly 
with age. The first four T intervals are only 1, 1, 2 and 6 years. The next 
four intervals are just one decade each, followed by a .70 year interval 
with a single failure. It appeared meaningful for trend identification to 
allow a larger statistical error in this interval .. 
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The first column in fig. 3 gives the number of units built in each 
tc interval, denoted by b~. The next column lists the number of the corres-
ponding ruptures which equals b~ times the aver~ge failure fraction s;. 
The row at the bottarn of Fig. 3 notes the number of failures in the chosen 
age-intervals, i.e. M~(T}. 
Statistical errors araund the interval-values listed in Fig. 3, 
regarded as best estimates, are obtained in terms of 68% confidence 
intervals by standard formulas. Figure 4 shows the interval values with 
the respective confidence intervals for s1(tc} and M(T}. These values suggest 
the presence of significant trends in s1(tc} as well as M(T), ~ince early 
and later values are separated by several 68% confidence intervals. 
Only if these intervals would overlap the assumption of a constant failure 
rate would have some justification, and with it the formation of a historical 
average value. This is obviously not the case. 
The interval-values, s1(Ec) and K1(T), provide statistically fluctuat-
ing information on the respective underlying variations, s1(tc} and K1(T}, 
that should be fairly continuous. Therefore, continuous estimations are 
derived from the interval values. For details of these continuous approxi-
mations, see Ref. 11, where dam safety has been used as an example for the 
illustration of the methodology. 
The age dependency M(T) is approximated by a sum of two expontential 
functions*: 
-b T -b T 
M(T} - a e 1 + a e 2 
- 1 2 
* a1 = 8/yr; a2 = 1/yr; b1 = 0.5/yr; b2 = 0.05/yr 
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A large value for b1 accounts for rapid decrease of dam failures during 
the first few years of operation, that to a large extent should result 
from a decrease in the chance for foundation failures (see Fig. 4) • 
The continuous approximation for the actuarial failure ratio in Fig. 4 
is represented by a modified Gaussian*: 
An approximation like this might suggest a slow technical progress in the 
last century, but an increasingly rapid improvement of dam safety through-
out this century. 
III.2 Campletion of the Failure Information 
The quantities s1(tc) and K1(T) are based an the summations over the 
actuarial information, i.e. over the left lower triangle in Fig. 3. They 
are approximations for the underlying idealized functions S(tc,Ts) and 
K(T,tc) that pertain to the same operating period T for all tc. The 
--- s 
diagonal in Fig. 3 corresponds to the end of the observation period for 
each tc1 whereas the ••completed" quantities S and K are defined in the 
reetangle that ~s indicated in Fig. 3 by a dotted line. Thus, future 
failure events have to be projected into the upper triangle. This is 
feasible for dam failures if the age dependency K(T,tc) is assumed to 
be independent of tc, i.e. K(T,tc) ~ K(T). The function of K(T) is then 
to be derived from the actuarial data as proper average value. (For technolo-
gies with a rich failure data statistics it may be possible to infer K(T,tc) 
* c = 1 0.15; c2 
4 
= 3.3·10 yr; c3 = 2.5 
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as basis for an improved projection procedure.). 
The average K(t) cannot be found independently of S(tc,ts}· It is 
shown in Ref. 11 that K(t) and S(tc,t5 ) are related.to each other by a 
coupled system of two integral equations, that contain the actuarial in-
formation in terms of s1(tc) and M(t). The (iterative) solution of this 
equation yields simultaneously S and K. 
The completion of s1 and K1 by the evaluated functions S(tc,ts) 
and K{t) is shown in Figs. 5 and 6. The difference between s1 and S as well 
as between K1 and K(r) is not very large over most of the observation 
period. The reason is that K(t) decreases very strongly. Therefore, during 
the first few decades, depicted in Fig. 5, S(tc) is quite close to s1(tc), 
since nearly all failures that can be expected in the present dam popu-
lation have already occurred. However, toward the end of the observation 
period, S{tc) is about 70% larger than s1(tc), a difference that is not 
unimportant in view ofthelarge number of existing dams (nearly 4000). 
The difference between S(tc) and s1(tc) can also be expressed in 
terms of additional failures that may have to be expected in the future. 
The completion procedure applied here yields 6.4 additional failures in 
the considered embankment dam population of about 4000 large dams in addi-
tion to the 40 failures that have occurred in the past. 
Figure 6 shows the comparison of K1(t) with K(t). Since the total 
Observation period amounts to more than 120 years, the failures during the 
first 30 years of age are documented by a large part of the existing pop~­
lation. Only for dams of the present population that are or will be older 
than aböut 30 y~ars~ the applied completion procedure yields an addition 
to K1(t) as indicated in Fig. 6. The turn from K1(t) into K(r) could be 
interpreted as an indication of a 11 bathtub .. -type curve leading to an 
increasing failure probability for large age (~ 100 years}. But the 
'* but not more than r 5 years 
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st~tistical information is not sufficient to draw such a conclusion; there 
is only a single failure between 50 and 120 years of age in the evaluated 
dam population. 
III.3 The Failure Potential 
From S(tc) and the construction rate b(tc) one obtains the "marginal 
failure potential," i.e. the failure potential added in the construction 
"year" tc: 
P(tc) = S(tc) b(tc). 
Apparently, the marginal failure potential,P, is related to the annual 
failure rate, A(t), by the convolution integral 
t 
A(t) = J P(tc) K(t-tc) dtc; 
to 
i.e. A(t) is a composite of earlier additions of potential failures multi-
plied with the probability that they occur at age T = t-tc. Here, t 0 is 
the beginning of the observation period. If K(T) is as strongly decreasing 
as it is the case for large dams (50% of all failures occur during the 
first 5 years of operation for the data used here), A(t) "follows" P(tc) 
with a few years delay. This appears tobe confirmed by Fig. 7. The strong 
addition of failure potential between 1900 and 1920 is followed by noticeable 
increase in the actual annual failure rate, A{t). Since about 1920 however, 
the improvement in dam safety has been overcompensating the increasing 
construction rate. 
III.4 Failure Ratios and Age Distributions for Different Causes 
The number of dam failures is too small to allow the application of 
the statistical completion analysis for individual causes. However, a 
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combination of the tompleted results, S(tc) and K(T), for the entire 
U.S. embankment dam population with the historically observed fractions 
of the various causes can provide some first order approximations. The 
results of this "combination" are depicted in Fig. 8 in the following way: 
The information on causes as well as on the magnitude of the failures 
(distinguishing totally lost from repaired dams) is portrayed as subdomains 
of squares. The size of the squares is related to the magnitudes of the 
continuous functions K(T) and S(tc) respectively at the midpoints of the 
considered T and tc intervals. These intervals are chosen such that 
information on 10 failures is available to break up the squares into. sub-
domains for the various causes. In this way it is possible to recognize 
improvements in the different cause categories as size reductions in the 
corresponding areas. It should be noted, however, that indicated trends 
of individual causes have considerable statistical inaccuracies because of 
the small number of ruptures. 
The upper figure shows that a large fraction of younger dams is 
reconstructed, but only a small fraction of older dams since they may be 
close to the end of their economic lifetime. Early in the dam life, 
especially during the first filling, foundation failure and seepage 
are known to be the most likely causes of failure, failures that are in a 
sense built-in by flaws in the design or the construction. Whereas the 
chance for foundation failures seems to diminish after some period of 
operation, seepage continues to be a failure cause throughout the dam•s 
1 i fe. 
In the lower diagram some variations seem to be indicated in the 
dependence of S(tc),somewhat higher values for foundation failures araund 
1905, and for overtopping araund 1920. Again, because of the small numbers, 
statistical fluctuations may overshadow the actual progress in the ~re­
vention of various causes of failures. 
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SUMMARY 
For the statistical evaluation of the evolution of the safety per-
formance of large dams, two methods are proposed and applied in this 
paper. The two methods address different measures of the safety performance. 
Both methods have been specifically devised for the analysis of "rare" 
events, where "rare" means that the average time-span between two (or a 
very few events) is so large that the technical progress during this time 
is n6t insignificant. Because of the substantial advance of dam design 
and construction methods, the characterization of the safety performance 
by a long-term av~raged failure rate is inadequate. 
The first method addresses the 11failure rate per dam-year" for various 
populations of large dams (~15m), embankment and concrete dams in USA 
and Western Europe, between 1850 and 1975. The regression method applied 
allows for learning and technical progress to manifest itself in terms 
of a reduction of the failure rate per dam-year with ti~e. The time 
intervals for this analysis are not arbitrarily imposed; they are determined 
by the regression procedure itself, based on the statistics of the actuarial 
failure-interval data. 
Examples of the numerical results obtained indicate a reduction of 
the failure rate of U.S. embankment dams from 0.8/100 araund 1860 to 
1.4/10,000 araund 1975. For U.S. concrete dams the reduction was even 
strenger, i.e. from 0.6/100 (late last century) to less than 0.6/10,000 
dam years beginning 1935. Similar, but generally somewhat smaller numbers 
are obtained for Western Europe. 
For U.S. embankment dam failures, a differentiation with respect 
to failure causes is possible. Results for failure rates are presented 
for the cause categories, overtopping, seepage, foundation failure and 
"others". 
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A secend class of questions· is concerned with the chance of a failure 
for dams of different vintage (or construction year, tc). The actuarial 
information for the time from construction to the end of the observation 
period gives a first measure, the observed failure ratio, s1(tc). By 
deriving infonnation on the age dependency of failure events [K(•); • = age] 
and extending the failure age distribution into the future, one can find 
a failure ratio S(tc,.5 ) that pertains to the same operation period •s 
for all construction years, tc. 
An evaluation of the failure ratio S(tc) and the age distribution 
K(-t) has been performed for U.S. embankment dams from 1850 through 1975. 
The ~xtension of s1(tc) by considering possible future failures consistent 
with the previous age distribution K(•) indicates that about 6 or 7 dams 
of the present population of 4000 might fail in the future. 
Finally, the failure ratio S(tc) ~llows us, through multiplication 
with the construction'rate b(tc), to define a "marginal failure potential," 
that is added in the "year" tc. Because K(•) is strongly decreasing with 
age, a major peak in the addition of failure potential can show up as a 
similar increase in the annual failure rate in the ensuing years. 
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u.s. Embankment Dam Failures 1850 - 1980 (Height ~ 15 m)* 
No. Name Year of Dam Type** Height Repair Reservoir Cause 
construc- rupture Capacity 
tion [m] [106m3] 
1 Cuba Reservoir 1851 1868 earth 16 yes unknown 
2 South Fork 1852 1889 earth/rock 22 no 19.0 overtopping ( Johnstown) 
3 Walnut Grove 1888 1890 rock 34 no 11.0 overtopping 
4 Chamberslake 1885 1891 earth 17 yes 10.0 overtopping (1st failure) 
5 Snake Ravine 1898 1898 earth 19 no seepage 
6 Lake Francis 1899 1899 earth 15 yes 0.9 seepage 
7 Utica Reser- 1874 1902 earth 21 no 0.7 other 
voir 
8 Greenlink 1901 1904 earth 18 yes 1.0 foudation (Scottdale) failure 
9 Chamberslake 1892 1907 earth 17 yes 10.0 unknown 
(2nd failure) 
10 Black Rock 1907 1909 earth/rock 21 yes 19.5 foundation (Zuni) failure 
11 Julesburg . 1905 1910 earth 16 yes 34.7 foundation 
fai lure 
12 Hebren 1913 1914 earth 17 yes seepage (1 s t f a i 1 u re) 
13 Hatchtown 1908 1914 earth 18 no 1 .0 seepage 
14 Horse Creek 1912 1914 earth 17 yes 20.9 foundation 
failure 
15 Sepulveda 
Canyon 
1914 1914 earth 19 no 0.2 overtopping 
16 Lyman 1913 1915 earth 19 yes 49.3 foundation 
failure 
17 Lake Toxaway 1902 1916 earth 18 no 3.7 foundation 
fai lure 
18 Long Tom 1906 1916 earth 18 yes seepage 
* Sources: Refs. 1, 3 to 7 , and 12 to 28 
** earth = earth filled, 
earth/rock = earth and rock filled, 
reck = rock filled embankment dam 
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Table 1 continued 
No. Name Year of Dam Type Height Repair Reservoir Cause 
construc- rupture Capacity 
tion [m] [106m3] 
19 Lookout 1915 1916 earth 25 yes 49.0 overtopping 
Shoals 
20 Lower Otway 1886 1916 earth/rock 39 no 39.6 overtopping 
21 Schaeffer 1911 1921 earth 30 no overtopping 
22 Apishapa 1920 1923 earth 34 no 23.0 seepage 
23 Graham Lake 1922 1923 earth 34 no foundation 
failure 
24 Mc Mahon Gulch 1924 1926 earth 16 yes overtopping 
25 Balsams 1927 1929 earth 18 no overtopping. 
26 Corpus 1930 1930 earth 18 yes 78.9 foundation 
Christi failure 
2. Wagner 1918 1938 earth 15 no 0.7 overtopping 
28 Anaconda 1898 1938 earth 21 no 0.3 seepage 
29 Hebren 1913 1942 earth 17 no overtopping (2nd failure) 
30 S inker Creek 1910 1943 earth 21 no 3.3 seepage 
31 Fred Surr 1947 1948 earth 16 yes 0.64 seepage 
32 Stockton Creek 1949 1950 earth 29 yes 0.5 seepage 
33 Ba 1 dw in H ill s 1951 1963 earth 80 no 1.0 foundation failure 
34 Little Deer 1962 1963 earth 25 no 1.8 seepage 
Creek 
35 Jenning Dam 1962 1963 earth 21 yes 0.43 foundation 
No. 3 failure 
36 Swift 1914 1964 earth/rock 57 no 37.0 overtopping 
37 Emery 1850 1966 earth 15 no seepage 
38 Sheep Creek 1969 1970 earth 18 yes seepage 
39 Whitewater 1943 1972 earth 18 no 0.5 overtopping 
Brook Upper 
40 Walter Soul- 1967 1975 earth 50 yes other 
din 
41 Teton 1975 1976 earth 92 no 355.0 seepage 
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T A B L E 2 
. . 
West European Embankment Dam Failures 1850 - 1980 (Height ~ 15 m) 
No. Name Year of Dam Type Height Repair Reservoir Cause 
construc- rupture Capacity 
tion [m] _[106m3] 
.. 
1. Woodhead 1851 1851 earth 26 yes foundation (U.K.) failure 
2. Dale.Dike 1858 1864 earth 29 no 3.1 seepage (U.K.) 
Sources: see Table 1 
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T A B L E 3 
U.S. Concrete Dam Failures 1850 • 1980 (Height ~ 15 m} 
No. Name Year of Dam Type Height Repair Reservoir Cause 
construc- rupture Capacity tion [m_] [106m3] 
1 Angels 1895 1895 gravity 16 no foundation 
failure 
2 Austin 1893 1900 gravity 20 Yes 21.0 overtopping 
Texas 
.. 
3 Austin (Pa.) 1909 1911 gravity 15 no 0.8 foundation (Bayless} failure 
.. 
4 Stony River 1913 1914 buttress 15 Yes 11.4 foundation 
failure 
5 Owerholser 1920 1923 buttress 16 Yes 19.0 overtopping 
6 Lake Lanier 1925 1926 arc 18 no foundation 
(Vaugh Creek} failure 
7 Moyie River after 1926 arc 16 no overtopping 
1920 
8 St. Francis 1926 1928 gravity 56 no 47.0 foundation 
failure 
9 Castelewood 1890 1933 gravity 28 no 4.3 · overtopping 
10 Lake Bareroft 1913 1972 gravity 21 yes overtopp i ng 
Sources: see Table 1 
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T A B L E 4 
West European Concrete Dam Failures 1850 - 1980 (Height ~ 15 m) 
No. Name Year of Dam Type Height Repair Reservoir Cause 
construc- rupture Capacity 
tion [m] [106m3] 
1 Bouzey 1888 1895 gravity 22 no 7.0 other (France) 
2 Gleno 1923 1923 buttress 49 no 5.4 foundation 
(Italy) failure 
3 Zerbino 1924 1935 gravity 16 no 8.0 overtopping (Italy) 
4 Vega de Tera 1956 1959 buttress 34 no 8.0 other (Spain) 
5 Malpasset 1954 1959 arc 66 no 48.0 foundation (France) failure 
6 Bacino di 1952 1965 buttress/ 15 no 0.31 foundation 
Rutte arc failure (Italy) 
Sources: see Table 1 
21 
TABLE 5: Time Spacings and Their Isotonic Estimate 
U.S.A. U.S.A. W.E. 
embankment dams concrete dams concrete dams 
k ßTk 6Tk k 6Tk 6Tk k ßTk ßTk 
1 130 130 1 201 168 1 684 684 
2 504 189 2 134 168 2 3106 . 3106 
3 44 189 3 681 566 3 4082 4082 
4 45 189 4 451 566 4 16130 8129 
5 385 189 5 2000 932 5 565 8129 
6 65 1ß9 6 752 932 6 7692 8129 
7 232 189 7 173 932 
8 186 189 8 763 932 
9 341 189 9 2147 2147 
10 283 189 10 25571 16290 
11 168 189 11 7009 16290 
12 663 189 
13 59 189 
14 59 189 
15 60 189 
16 246 189 k = failure number 
17 64 189 
18 64 189 
19 64 189 
20 64 189 
21 1379 673 
ßTk = operation-time difference of the 
, population of dams between successive 
· failure events numbered k-1 and k (years) 
22 475 673 
-
23 165 673 
24 1096 951 
ßTk = isotonic estimate of ßTk (years) 
25 1289 951 
26 468 951 
27 4098 1989 
28 320 1989 
29 2786 1989 
30 752 1989 
31 3891 2828 
32 1764 2828 
33 15900 4675 
34 602 4675 
35 602 4675 
36 1938 4675 
37 4329 4675 
38 10300 7260 
39 5750 7260 
40 9620 7260 
41 3370 7260 
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TABLE 6: Time Spacings and Their Isotonic Estimate for US Embankment Dams 
by Causes of Failures 
all causes overtopping seepage foundation others 
failure 
- - -k 6Tk 6Tk 6Tk 6Tk 6Tk 6Tk · 6T k 6Tk 6Tk 6Tk 
1 130 130 614 234 1075 570 1539 600 130 130 
2 504 189 43 234 65 570 599 600 1235 872 
3 44 189 44 234 1630 818 159. 600 508 872 
4 45 189 2174 965 105 818 578 600 66667 66667 
5 385 189 595 965 719 818 472 600 
6 65 189 125 965 2000 2000 251 600 
7 232 189 1351 1351 7092 4040 2000 2000 
8 186 189 1695 1473 3484 4040 2778 2778 
9 341 189 1250 1473 3861 4040 29430 15150 
10 283 189 4785 3763 1724 4040 870 15150 
11 168 189 2740 3763 16393 10818 
12 663 189 25000 22500 6061 10818 
13 59 189 20000 22500 10000 10818 
14 59 189 18519 18519 
15 60 189 
16 246 189 
17 64 189 
18 64 189 k = failure number 19 64 189 
20 64 189 6Tk = operation-time difference of the 21 1379 673 
22 475 673 population of dams between successive 23 165 673 failure events, numbered k-1 and k 24 1096 951 
25 1289 951 -
26 468 951 6\ = isotonic estimate of 6Tk (years) 
27 4098 1989 
28 320 1989 
29 2786 1989 
30 752 1989 
31 3891 2828 
32 1764 2828 
33 15900 4675 
34 602 4675 
35 602 4675 
36 1938 4675 
37 4329 4675 
38 10300 7260 
39 5750 7260 
40 9620 7260 
41 3370 7260 
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